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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2018, in One Step (Support) Ltd. v. Morris-Garner,1 the Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom laid down the circumstances in which damages
for breach of contract may be measured by reference to the amount of the fee
that the innocent party (the claimant) could have demanded from the
breaching party (the defendant) for a release of the latter from the relevant
obligation. The Court expressed the view that the award of such a notional
fee, which it labelled “negotiating damages,”2 compensates for the loss of the
value of the claimant’s right to control the use of an asset.3 This article, which
adopts the Court’s terminology and compensatory characterization of
negotiating damages,4 will briefly recount the development of that remedy in
English contract law and evaluate the Supreme Court’s decision in MorrisGarner.
Beforehand, it is useful to consider briefly the availability of negotiating
damages in other areas of English private law.5 They have been awarded in
actions for trespass to land in two categories of case. First, where the

*

Reader, Sussex Law School.
1

One Step (Support) Ltd. v. Morris-Garner [2018] UKSC 20, [2019] AC 649 (appeal taken from

Eng.).
2 The term was coined in Lunn Poly Ltd. v. Liverpool & Lancashire Props. Ltd. [2006] EWCA
(Civ) 430, [2007] L & TR 6 [22] and adopted in Pell Frischmann Eng’g Ltd. v. Bow Valley Iran Ltd.
[2009] UKPC 45, [2011] 1 WLR 2370 [48].
3

See Morris-Garner [2018] UKSC 20, [2019] AC 649 [30], [54], [95].

4

For some scholars, negotiating damages do not compensate loss, but are based on the gain made
by the defendant, see infra note 100, or are a substitute for the right infringed, ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS
AND RIGHTS 67–68 (2009); DAVID WINTERTON, MONEY AWARDS IN CONTRACT LAW 201–14 (2017). A
discussion of the nature or calculation of negotiating damages is beyond the scope of this article.
5

2018).

For a detailed account, see JAMES EDELMAN, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES 14-016–033 (20th ed.
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defendant has wrongfully used the claimant’s land, the claimant is entitled to
a “wayleave” award, whether or not the claimant would have made use of the
land. A key case is Whitwham v. Westminster Brymbo Coal & Coke Co.6
Over eight years, the defendant tipped spoil from its colliery onto the
neighboring land owned by the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal held that the
plaintiff was entitled not only to compensation for the diminution in value
that the spoil had caused to the land but also to a wayleave award reflecting
the value of using the land for dumping waste. Secondly, “mesne profit”
awards reflecting the letting value of the property have been made where a
tenant wrongfully stayed in occupation of the property after the end of the
lease. These circumstances were present in Swordheath Properties Ltd. v.
Tabet.7 The Court of Appeal held that the landlord was entitled to a mesne
profit award reflecting the letting value of the property, whether or not the
landlord would have let the property to someone else had the defendant not
been in occupation.
Negotiating damages have also been awarded in actions for wrongful
interference with goods. A key case is Strand Electric & Engineering Co.
Ltd. v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd.8 A theatre hired portable switchboards
from the plaintiff. When the defendant took over the theatre, it refused to
return the switchboards to the plaintiff and kept them in use. In an action for
detinue, the Court of Appeal awarded the plaintiff the full market rate of hire
of such switchboards for the whole period of detention. It was held
immaterial that only 75 percent of the plaintiff’s stock was out on hire at any
one time and that stock was sometimes loaned free of charge or accidentally
destroyed.
Where an intellectual property right is infringed culpably (i.e., the
defendant knew, or had reasonable grounds to know, that he engaged in
infringing activity), legislation provides that damages “may be awarded on
the basis of the royalties or fees which would have been due had the
defendant obtained a licence.”9 The same principle has been recognized at
common law, as demonstrated by the Scottish case Watson, Laidlaw & Co.
6 Whitwham v. Westminster Brymbo Coal & Coke Co. (1896) 2 Ch 538. Other Court of Appeal
authority includes Eaton Mansions (Westminster) Ltd. v. Stinger Compania De Inversion SA [2013]
EWCA (Civ) 1308, [2014] HLR 4; Enfield LBC v. Outdoor Plus Ltd. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 608, [2012]
CP Rep 35; Severn Trent Water Ltd. v. Barnes [2004] EWCA (Civ) 570, (2004) 2 EGLR 95; Lawson v.
Hartley-Brown (1996) 71 P & CR 242.
7 Swordheath Props. Ltd. v. Tabet (1979) 27 P & CR 327. Other Court of Appeal authority includes
ParkingEye Ltd. v. Beavis [2015] EWCA (Civ) 402, [2015] RTR 27 [50]; Viscount Chelsea v. Hutchinson
(1996) 28 HLR 17; Ministry of Defence v. Ashman (1993) 25 HLR 513; Ministry of Defence v. Thompson
(1993) 25 HLR 552.
8 Strand Elec. & Eng’g Co. v. Brisford Entm’ts Ltd. [1952] 2 QB 246; see also Mediana (Owners)
v. Comet (Owners) (The Mediana) [1900–03] All ER 126; Watson, Laidlaw & Co. v. Pott, Cassels &
Williamson [1914] SC 18 (HL) 31 (Lord Shaw); Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co. (Nos 4 and
5) [2002] UKHL 19, [2002] 2 AC 883 (HL) [87].
9

Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc.) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1028, ¶ 3(2)(b) (UK).
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Ltd. v. Pott, Cassels & Williamson.10 The defender sold machines infringing
the pursuers’ patent. The House of Lords held that the pursuers were entitled
to damages in respect of sales which the defender had made in a territory in
which the pursuers themselves could not have traded. Lord Shaw recognized
a principle of “price or hire” applying in all cases of wrongful interference
with property.11 Negotiating damages are also available in actions for breach
of an equitable duty of confidence12 but are unlikely to be awarded in actions
for breach of privacy.13
II. NEGOTIATING DAMAGES IN ENGLISH CONTRACT LAW
BEFORE ONE STEP (SUPPORT) LTD. V. MORRIS-GARNER
The first English case in which negotiating damages were awarded in an
action for breach of contract is Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside
Homes Ltd.14 The defendant developer built houses on land in breach of a
restrictive covenant, registered as a land charge, which made the
development of the land subject to approval by the owner of the neighboring
land (the plaintiff). In an action for breach of contract (which is the type of
action used for the enforcement of a restrictive covenant) against the
defendant and the purchasers of the houses, the plaintiff sought an injunction
but not an interlocutory injunction. By the time of the trial, the houses had
been completed and were occupied by the purchasers. Judge Brightman
refused to grant a mandatory injunction for the demolition of the buildings.15
He awarded damages under what is known as Lord Cairns’ Act,16 which
provides that a court with jurisdiction to grant an injunction or specific
performance may award damages in addition to, or in substitution for, such
specific relief. Judge Brightman said that while the value of the plaintiff’s
land was not diminished at all, the defendant should not retain all of the fruits
of its wrongdoing.17 Referring to the above-mentioned user principle in tort,
he said that even though the plaintiff would never have consented to any
development of the land, a just substitute for an injunction was a sum of
money that the plaintiff might reasonably have demanded from the defendant

10

Watson, Laidlaw & Co. [1914] SC (HL) 18.

11

Id. at 31; see also Rickless v. United Artists Corp. [1986] FSR 502, 524–25 (for copyright);
General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. [1975] 1 WLR 819, 826 (for patent).
12 Marathon Asset Mgmt. LLP v. Seddon [2017] EWHC (Comm) 300, [2017] ICR 791 [261]; CF
Partners (UK) LLP v. Barclays Bank PLC [2014] EWHC (Ch) 3049 [1195].
13

See Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (No 3) [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, [2006] QB 125 [246].

14

Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. Parkside Homes Ltd. [1974] 1 WLR 798.

15

Id. at 811.

16

Chancery Amendment Act 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. c.27, s 2 (UK). The same provision is now in
section 50 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 c.54 (UK).
17

Wrotham Park Estate Co. [1974] 1 WLR 798, 812.
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for a relaxation of the covenant.18 He awarded five percent of the profit the
defendant had anticipated to make from the development.19
In Attorney General v. Blake,20 where the House of Lords (with the
dissent of Lord Hobhouse) held that an account of profits may exceptionally
be awarded in an action for breach of contract, Lord Nicholls, giving the
leading speech, expressed the view that negotiating damages are based on the
benefit gained by the wrongdoer from the breach, rather than any loss
suffered by the victim.21 His Lordship approved the decision in Wrotham
Park, describing it as a “solitary beacon.”22 This endorsement of Wrotham
Park prompted the courts to award negotiating damages not only for breach
of a restrictive covenant over land under Lord Cairns’ Act23 but also for
breach of other contractual obligations under Lord Cairns’ Act24 and at
common law.25
An important example is Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX Enterprises
26
Inc. The parties settled a dispute over the copyright in certain Jimi Hendrix
songs by agreeing that the defendant was entitled to fulfill existing licenses
over those songs but was not permitted to grant new licenses without the
consent of the estate of Jimi Hendrix. The defendant deliberately granted new
licenses without such consent. The claimant, to whom the benefit of the
settlement agreement had been assigned, sued the defendant for breach of
that agreement, seeking an injunction to restrain further breaches and
damages. An injunction was granted. With regard to damages for past
breaches, the claimant conceded that it had no evidence to show any financial
loss resulting from those breaches, but contended that it was entitled to
negotiating damages in the amount that the claimant could reasonably have
demanded for relaxing the prohibition against the grant of further licenses.27
Relying on Wrotham Park and Blake, the Court of Appeal held that

18

Id. at 813–15.

19

Id. at 816.

20

Att’y Gen. v. Blake [2001] 1 AC 268.

21

Id. at 278–83.

22

Id. at 283, where he also disapproved of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Surrey Cty. Council
v. Bredero Homes Ltd. [1993] 1 WLR 1361 insofar as it was inconsistent with Wrotham Park. The Court
of Appeal had followed Wrotham Park in Jaggard v. Sawyer (1995) 1 WLR 269.
23

Amec Devs. Ltd. v. Jury’s Hotel Mgmt. (U.K.) Ltd. [2002] TCLR 13, (2001) 82 P & CR 22

[11].
24 See, e.g., Pell Frischmann Eng’g Ltd. v. Bow Valley Iran Ltd. [2009] UKPC 45, [2011] 1 WLR
2370 (breach of a contractual duty of confidentiality); Lunn Poly Ltd. v. Liverpool & Lancashire Props.
Ltd. [2006] EWCA (Civ) 430, [2007] L & TR 6 (landlord’s breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment).
25 See, e.g., Lane v. O’Brien Homes Ltd. [2004] EWHC 303 (QB) (common law damages for
breach of a collateral contract not to build on certain land, which was not registered as an interest in land).
26
27

Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. PPX Enters. Inc. [2003] EWCA (Civ) 323, [2003] FSR 46.

In the alternative, the claimant sought an account of profits in accordance with Blake. The Court
of Appeal held that the case was not sufficiently exceptional to warrant such an award.
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negotiating damages should be awarded. The Court recognized that in
Wrotham Park such damages were awarded in lieu of an injunction under
Lord Cairns’ Act. But the Court said that the assessment of damages for past
breaches should not depend upon whether future breaches are restrained by
an injunction, and Blake demonstrated that common law damages for breach
of contract could also be measured by reference to the gain made by the
contract-breaker.28
Subsequently, in WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wrestling
Federation Entertainment Inc., the Court of Appeal said that both an account
of profits and an award of negotiating damages are compensatory, not gainbased, remedies and are available only where the claimant cannot
demonstrate “identifiable financial loss.”29 In Marathon Asset Management
LLP v. Seddon, Judge Leggatt said that both remedies are gain-based and that
the Court of Appeal in WWF had used the term “compensatory” merely in
the broad sense of redress for wrongdoing.30 Judge Leggatt also held that in
actions for breach of contract negotiating damages are available only where
the contract protects a proprietary interest.31
III. ONE STEP (SUPPORT) LTD. V. MORRIS-GARNER—FACTS AND
DECISION
The current rules on the availability of negotiating damages in English
contract law were laid down by the UK Supreme Court in Morris-Garner.32
The claimant company provided supported living care for vulnerable children
and adults. The defendants, who were a former director and shareholder and
a former manager of the claimant, set up a business which also engaged in
providing living care in the same areas in which the claimant operated. After
the defendants had sold their business, the claimant sued the defendants for
breach of restrictive covenants not to compete with the claimant, solicit its
clients or use its confidential information, for a period of 36 months. The
claimant produced reports by forensic accountants quantifying the loss the
claimant had allegedly suffered as a result of the breach (between £3.4m and
£4.6m), the benefits obtained by the defendants, and a hypothetical fee for
releasing the defendants from the restrictions (between £5.6m and £6.3m).

28 Experience Hendrix L.L.C. [2003] EWCA (Civ) 323, [2003] FSR 46 [34]–[35] (Mance LJ),
[56]–[58] (Peter Gibson LJ). Hooper J agreed with both Mance LJ and Peter Gibson LJ.
29 WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t Inc. [2007] EWCA (Civ)
286, [2008] 1 WLR 445 [59] (Chadwick LJ speaking for the court).
30

Marathon Asset Mgmt. LLP v. Seddon [2017] EWHC 300 (Comm), [2017] 2 CLC 182 [199]–

[202].
31 Id. at [216], where he also observed that the interest of the claimant in Experience Hendrix could
be characterized as proprietary or quasi-proprietary.
32

Morris-Garner [2018] UKSC 20, [2019] AC 649.
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The trial judge found that the defendants were in breach of the noncompetition and non-solicitation covenants, and held that, since it would be
difficult for the claimant to identify the loss it had suffered as a result of the
breach, the claimant should have the choice between an award of negotiating
damages and an award of ordinary compensatory damages.33 The claimant
chose the former and a hearing on quantum was fixed. Before that hearing
could take place, the defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed
the appeal, holding that negotiating damages could be awarded in an action
for breach of contract whenever this was a just response and not only where
the case was exceptional or where the claimant could not demonstrate
identifiable loss.34
The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the defendants’ appeal,
holding that the hearing on quantum ordered by the judge should proceed for
the quantification of the financial loss actually sustained by the claimant, and
while it was for the trial judge to determine the relevance and weight of
evidence in relation to a hypothetical release fee, such a fee was not itself the
measure of the claimant’s loss.35 Separate judgments were delivered by Lord
Reed JSC, with whom Baroness Hale PSC, Lord Wilson and Lord Carnwath
JJSC agreed, by Lord Sumption JSC and by Lord Carnwath JSC.
Lord Reed JSC observed that Lord Cairns’ Act damages awarded in lieu
of an injunction are equitable in nature and are not necessarily measured in
the same way as common law damages.36 His Lordship also said that the
courts had conceived of awards of negotiating damages as compensating for
loss.37 Crucially, Lord Reed JSC rejected the proposition that negotiating
damages can be awarded whenever they appear to be a just response.38
Lord Reed JSC confirmed that negotiating damages can be awarded
under Lord Cairns’ Act in substitution of specific relief (although this is not
the only method of assessing Lord Cairns’ Act damages). He said:
One possible method of quantifying damages under this head
is on the basis of the economic value of the right which the
court has declined to enforce, and which it has consequently
rendered worthless. Such a valuation can be arrived at by
reference to the amount which the claimant might reasonably
have demanded as quid pro quo for the relaxation of the
obligation in question. The rationale is that, since the

33

One Step (Support) Ltd. v. Morris-Garner [2014] EWHC 2213 (QB), [107]–[108].

34

One Step (Support) Ltd. v. Morris-Garner [2016] EWCA (Civ) 180, [2017] QB 1,
A2/2014/2727 (appeal taken from QB).
35

Morris-Garner [2018] UKSC 20, [2019] AC 649.

36

Id. at [46]–[47].

37

Id. at [79].

38

Id. at [81], [97].
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withholding of specific relief has the same practical effect as
requiring the claimant to permit the infringement of his
rights, his loss can be measured by reference to the economic
value of such permission.39
Lord Cairns’ Act damages were not available in the case at hand, as no
injunction had or could have been claimed, and Lord Reed JSC turned to the
availability of negotiating damages at common law. His Lordship observed
that “[c]ommon law damages for breach of contract are . . . normally based
on the difference between the effect of performance and non-performance
upon the claimant’s situation.”40 But he recognized that there are
circumstances in which an award of negotiating damages is compatible with
the compensatory purpose of contractual damages. Lord Reed JSC said:
[S]uch circumstances can exist in cases where the breach of
contract results in the loss of a valuable asset created or
protected by the right which was infringed, as for example
in cases concerned with the breach of a restrictive covenant
over land, an intellectual property agreement or
confidentiality agreement . . . The claimant has in substance
been deprived of a valuable asset, and his loss can therefore
be measured by determining the economic value of the asset
in question. The defendant has taken something for nothing,
for which the claimant was entitled to require payment.41
Lord Reed JSC added that the contractual right must be “of such a kind
that its breach can result in an identifiable loss equivalent to the economic
value of the right, considered as an asset,” even in the absence of loss
measurable in the ordinary way.42 A non-competition obligation is not of that
kind, he said, as it is difficult to see how its breach could cause any loss other
than loss resulting from the wrongful competition, such as loss of profit and
goodwill, which is measurable by conventional means.43
Lord Sumption JSC expressed the view that the cases in which
negotiating damages had been awarded can be grouped into three categories.
The first is where the claimant has an interest in the observance of his rights
which extends beyond financial reparation.44 This category comprises cases
involving an invasion of property rights and Blake.45 The second category is
where, as in Wrotham Park, the relevant obligation was in principle
39

Id. at [95].

40

Id.

41

Id. at [92].

42

Id. at [93].

43

Id.

44

Id. at [109].

45

Id. at [110]–[111].
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specifically enforceable and the notional release fee is the price of nonenforcement.46 The third category is where the claimant has (or may be
assumed to have) suffered pecuniary loss and the notional release fee is
treated as evidence of that loss, representing the value that reasonable people
in the parties’ position would place on the performance of the relevant
obligation.47 This category comprises patent infringement cases,48 cases
involving the breach of a contractual or equitable duty not to misuse
confidential information,49 and some other contractual cases such as
Experience Hendrix.50
Lord Carnwath JSC expressed agreement with Lord Reed JSC.51 He
identified differences between the approaches of Lord Reed JSC and Lord
Sumption JSC.52 He rejected the approach of Lord Sumption JSC, arguing
that it conflicts with the previous development of the law (in particular, the
fact that cases of patent infringement are carved out from Lord Sumption’s
first category), that it gave no clear indication of the circumstances falling
within the third category, and that the third category blurred the difference
between the concept of loss and the concept of a negotiated fee.53
One important consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in MorrisGarner is that negotiating damages cannot be awarded for breach of a noncompetition covenant unless the breach is ongoing when proceedings
commence.54 As Morris-Garner itself illustrates, the breach of a noncompetition covenant has often ceased before an action is brought, as noncompetition covenants are usually short in duration (to ensure their validity)
and the defendant often proceeds surreptitiously, so that the period of
restriction has expired by the time the claimant becomes aware of the breach
and is in a position to take legal action.

46

Id. at [109], [112].

47

Id. at [109], [115].

48

Id. at [116].

49

Id. at [120].

50

Id. at [121]–[122].

51

Id. at [127].

52

Id. at [130]–[131].

53

Id. at [133]–[137].

54

See Keystone Healthcare Ltd. v. Parr [2018] EWHC 1509 (Ch) [225]–[227].
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IV. ONE STEP (SUPPORT) LTD. V. MORRIS-GARNER —CRITIQUE
The evaluation of the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Morris-Garner
will focus on Lord Reed’s judgment, as all other law lords (except Lord
Sumption JSC) agreed with him.55
Lord Reed JSC laid down that in actions for breach of contract
negotiating damages are available only in two categories of case. His
Lordship therefore rejected the proposition, endorsed by the Court of Appeal
in Morris-Garner, that in actions for breach of contract, negotiating damages
may be awarded whenever the court regards such an award as a just response.
It is useful to evaluate that proposition in general before examining in detail
the two categories of case set out by Lord Reed JSC.
For more than 170 years, English courts have consistently said that
“where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far
as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to
damages, as if the contract had been performed.”56 The usual measure of
contractual damages is therefore expectation loss, identified by comparing
the claimant’s actual position after the defendant’s breach with the position
the claimant would have been in had the defendant performed the contract.57
An award of negotiating damages has a different aim. It places the claimant
in the position, not as if the contract had been performed, but as if the contract
had been replaced by a different contract. It would undermine the aim of
contractual damages if negotiating damages could be awarded in actions for
breach of contract simply because the court regards it as a just response.
A comparison with reliance damages illuminates the point. Reliance
damages are calculated by reference to the position as if the contract had not
been made. Since the method of their calculation does not reflect the aim of
contractual damages of placing the claimant in the position as if the contract
had been performed, reliance damages are not routinely available simply at
the claimant’s election. They are unavailable where their award would place
the claimant in a better position than if the contract had been performed.58
Reliance damages are available only as a subsidiary remedy where the
defendant’s breach of contract has made it impossible to calculate
expectation loss and where it can be presumed that the claimant would at
55 See Caspar Bartscherer, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: One Step (Support) LTD v MorrisGarner and Another, 82 MODERN L. REV. 367, 372–76 (2019), for an illuminating critique of Lord
Sumption’s judgment.
56 Morris-Garner [2018] UKSC 20, [2019] AC 649 [32]; Ruxley Elecs. & Constr. Ltd. v. Forsyth
[1996] AC 344, 355, 365; Swingcastle Ltd. v. Alastair Gibson [1991] 2 AC 223, 237; Koufos v. C
Czarnikow Ltd. [1969] 1 AC 350, 414, 420; Robinson v. Harman (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 363, 365; 1 Exch.
850, 855 (Parke B).
57 E.g., Classic Maritime Inc. v. Limbungan Makmur SDN BHD [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1102,
[2019] 2 All ER (Comm) 592 [81].
58

C & P Haulage v. Middleton [1983] 1 WLR 1461.
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least have broken even had the contract been performed.59 Reliance loss then
constitutes the minimum amount of expectation loss.60 Where expectation
loss can be calculated, reliance damages are unavailable.61
Like reliance damages, negotiating damages ought to be unavailable
where expectation loss can be compensated.62 Conversely, negotiating
damages ought to be available “where the claimant may have difficulty in
proving economic loss or where the claimant has a non-financial interest in
upholding the right infringed that would not be reflected in a conventional
award of damages.”63 The view that in actions for breach of contract
negotiating damages ought to be available if, and only if, there would
otherwise be a remedial lacuna was taken by Singapore’s Court of Appeal in
a decision rendered less than four months after the UK Supreme Court’s
decision in Morris-Garner.64
In Morris-Garner, Lord Reed JSC recognized that negotiating damages
do not achieve the aim of contractual damages of placing the claimant in the
position as if the contract had been performed.65 While this might have
justified the abolition of negotiating damages for breach of contract
altogether,66 his Lordship did not even limit their scope to circumstances
where expectation damages cannot be awarded. He merely limited their
scope to the two categories of case that he was setting out.67 Thus, in a case
falling into either or both of those categories, negotiating damages seem to
be available even if an award of expectation loss could be made. In this
respect, negotiating damages have a wider scope in English law than in
Singaporean law.
Singapore’s Court of Appeal rejected a restriction of negotiating
damages to the two categories of case laid down by the UK Supreme Court

59 Grange v. Quinn [2013] EWCA Civ 24, [2013] 1 P & CR 279; CCC Films (London) Ltd. v.
Impact Quadrant Films Ltd. [1985] QB 16.
60

See ADAM KRAMER, THE LAW OF CONTRACT DAMAGES 1–41 (2d ed. 2017).

61

Omak Maritime Ltd. v. Mamola Challenger Shipping Co. Ltd. [2010] EWHC 2026 (Comm),
[2011] Bus LR 212.
62 ANDREW BURROWS, REMEDIES FOR TORTS, BREACH OF CONTRACT, AND EQUITABLE WRONGS
331 (4th ed. 2019). But see Graham Virgo, Gain-Based Remedies, in COMMERCIAL REMEDIES:
RESOLVING CONTROVERSIES 292, 304, 310–11 (Graham Virgo & Sarah Worthington eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2017).
63

BURROWS, supra note 62, at 331.

64

Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd. v. Yeo Boong Hua [2018] SGCA 44, [2018] 2 SLR 655
[130], [173]–[74], [217]–[19] (Sing.) (where the Court also said that negotiating damages are unavailable
where reliance damages can be awarded. This rule may not be appropriate where reliance loss is very
small. A discussion of that issue is beyond the scope of this article.).
65

Morris-Garner [2018] UKSC 20, [2019] AC 649 [91].

66

William Day, Restitutions for Wrongs: One Step Forwards, Two Steps Back?, 26 RESTITUTION
L. REV. 60, 67 (2018).
67

Morris-Garner [2018] UKSC 20, [2019] AC 649 [91].
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in Morris-Garner.68 The first category is where the claimant has sought
specific relief and the court denies the grant of specific relief on discretionary
grounds and awards damages in lieu under Lord Cairns’ Act. The second
category is “where the breach of contract results in the loss of a valuable asset
created or protected by the right which was infringed.”69 For each category,
it will now be investigated whether its boundary is clear and defensible on
principle. One thing should be noted at the outset. While the first category is
defined by reference to a procedural event (the denial of specific relief), the
second category is defined by reference to the type of right infringed. There
is, thus, considerable overlap between the two categories.
Starting with the first category, its contours seem clear. It captures cases
where the claimant has sought specific relief and the court, having
jurisdiction to grant specific relief, denies the grant of specific relief on
discretionary grounds and awards damages in lieu under Lord Cairns’ Act.
The specific relief sought and denied may be in respect of future wrongdoing
(in particular, a prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from
engaging, or continuing to engage, in certain conduct in the future) or past
wrongdoing (a mandatory injunction ordering the defendant to undo the
effects of past wrongdoing). Thus, the damages awarded may compensate
future or past loss.
When it comes to the justifiability of Lord Reed’s first category on
principle, it is necessary to distinguish between its inclusionary effect and its
exclusionary effect. It is easy to see why negotiating damages should be
available in cases falling within the first category. By denying specific relief,
the court in effect permits the defendant to engage in the wrongful conduct
(in the case of future conduct)70 or permits the consequences of the
defendant’s wrongful conduct to subsist (in the case of past conduct). To that
extent, the claimant is in effect deprived of the right infringed. Negotiating
damages may be regarded as the fee that the defendant pays to the claimant
in return for the court giving the defendant “permission” to infringe the
claimant’s right.71 It is similar to a compulsory license over a patent, where
the state compels the patentee to grant a license to a particular person in return
for a royalty.72
It is less easy to see why negotiating damages should be unavailable
(leaving aside Lord Reed’s second category) only because specific relief has
not been claimed. An attempt to justify this by reference to the scope of
application of Lord Cairns’ Act would fail for two reasons. First, it is by no

68

Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd [2018] SGCA 44, [2018] 2 SLR 655 [278]–[86] (Sing.).
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Morris-Garner [2018] UKSC 20, [2019] AC 649 [92] (Lord Reed JSC).

70

Jaggard v. Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269, 286 (Millett LJ).
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See Att’y Gen. v. Blake [2001] 1 AC 268, 281 (Lord Nicholls).
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Patents Act 1977, ss 48–48B (UK).
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means clear that the applicability of the Act requires an application for
specific relief. Such a requirement has been rejected in some cases,73
although Lord Reed JSC in Morris-Garner expressed doubts.74 Secondly, it
is difficult to see why the availability of negotiating damages should depend
upon whether damages are awarded under Lord Cairns’ Act or at common
law.75 Lord Cairns’ Act was enacted when the common law and the rules of
equity were administered by different courts. The Act aimed to ensure that a
claimant whose claim for specific relief had been denied by the Court of
Chancery, and who wished to obtain damages, did not have to start new
proceedings in the common law courts but could obtain damages
immediately from the Court of Chancery.76 The purpose of the Act was
predominantly procedural,77 and it is difficult to see why a certain measure
of damages should be available under the Act but not at common law or vice
versa. Considering the historical aim of the Act, the measure of damages
under the Act should generally be the same as at common law, which used to
be accepted.78 It is surprising that Lord Reed JSC in Morris-Garner said that
an identical measure of damages “is hardly to be expected.”79
The unavailability of negotiating damages (leaving aside Lord Reed’s
second category) is particularly difficult to justify where the reason for the
absence of a claim for specific relief is that the claimant reasonably expects
that specific relief would be denied on discretionary grounds. Millett LJ in
Jaggard v. Sawyer supported the applicability of Lord Cairns’ Act in those
circumstances by saying: “It would be absurd to require [the claimant] to
include a claim for an injunction if he is sufficiently realistic to recognize that
in the circumstances he is unlikely to obtain one.”80 It would be equally
absurd to require the claimant to include a claim for specific relief that is
bound to be denied, for the sole purpose of rendering negotiating damages
available. They should be available in those circumstances under Lord
Cairns’ Act (if it is considered applicable) and at common law. By denying
them in the absence of a claim for specific relief, the decision in Morris-

73 E.g., Pell Frischmann Eng’g Ltd. v. Bow Valley Iran Ltd. [2009] UKPC 45, [2011] 1 WLR
2370 [48].
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Morris-Garner [2018] UKSC 20, [2019] AC 649 [45].
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See Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v. Yeo Boong Hua [2018] SGCA 44, [2018] 2 SLR 655
[286] (Sing.).
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Ferguson v. Wilson (1866) 2 Ch App. 77, 88.
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Garner gives claimants an incentive to make a futile claim for specific
relief.81
Where the court has no jurisdiction to grant specific relief because the
wrong ceased before the start of the proceedings and its effects cannot be
undone, Millett LJ in Jaggard v. Sawyer regarded Lord Cairns’ Act as
inapplicable and rejected the availability of negotiating damages at common
law on the ground that the claimant’s bargaining position has been destroyed
and his right devalued.82 Millett LJ was adopting the conceptualization of
negotiating damages as compensation for a lost opportunity to bargain.83
Whatever the merits of that conceptualization, the problem with Millett LJ’s
argument is that the claimant’s bargaining position will not be much
stronger84 in the case of an ongoing wrong if it is clear that an application for
specific relief would be denied on discretionary grounds. Yet, negotiating
damages are available in the latter case if specific relief is being sought.
Moreover, a defendant who has engaged in wrongful conduct without
seeking the claimant’s permission may be said to have appropriated a
“license” and ought to face being liable to pay a notional license fee in the
same way as a defendant who is granted a “compulsory license” by the
court.85 Where the claimant became aware of the defendant’s wrongful
conduct while it was still ongoing but unreasonably delayed commencing
proceedings, negotiating damages are likely to be restricted to the loss
suffered before the date by which the claimant acting reasonably could have
obtained an (interim) injunction86 and might be denied altogether.87
Andrew Burrows argues that where the wrong is neither anticipated nor
ongoing and all losses are in the past, the unavailability of negotiating
damages is understandable because they “might be thought especially
appropriate where they obviate the need, in assessing compensatory

81 Paul S. Davies, One Step Backwards: Restricting Negotiating Damages for Breach of Contract,
LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 433, 440 (2018).
82

Jaggard [1995] 1 WLR 269, 291.
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See Robert J. Sharpe & S. M. Waddams, Damages for Lost Opportunity to Bargain, 2 OXFORD
J.L. STUD. 290 (1982). But see Andrew Burrows, Are “Damages on the Wrotham Park Basis”
Compensatory, Restitutionary or Neither?, in CONTRACT DAMAGES: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 169–71 (Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington eds., Hart 2008); Ralph Cunnington, The
Measure and Availability of Gain-Based Damages for Breach of Contract, in CONTRACT DAMAGES:
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 220–22 (Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington eds.,
Hart 2008).
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damages, to speculate as to the future.”88 This is not entirely convincing. The
assessment of past loss requires the court to determine what would have
happened without the defendant’s wrong, and an inquiry into the hypothetical
may be as difficult as to determine what will happen in the future.
Furthermore, even where the wrong is neither anticipated nor ongoing and
all losses are in the past, negotiating damages are available if, as happened in
Wrotham Park, a mandatory injunction to undo the effects of the wrong has
been denied on discretionary grounds.
The unavailability of negotiating damages for breach of contract
(leaving aside Lord Reed’s second category) can be justified where the court
has no jurisdiction to grant specific relief and the reason for this is that
damages, assessed in an orthodox way (and not by reference to a hypothetical
release fee89), are adequate.90 Damages are adequate in this context where
substitute performance is available in the market.91 The cost of substitute
performance constitutes expectation loss.92 As explained earlier, negotiating
damages ought to be unavailable where expectation damages can be awarded.
It should be noted that damages are typically inadequate where the obligation
breached is a negative obligation (an obligation not to perform a certain act),
as substitute performance by a third party is not possible.
Turning to Lord Reed’s second category, its scope in relation to breach
of contract is not immediately clear. His Lordship said that the contractual
right must be “of such a kind that its breach can result in an identifiable loss
equivalent to the economic value of the right, considered as an asset, even in
the absence of any pecuniary losses which are measurable in the ordinary
way.”93 This definition is very abstract, and it is not immediately clear what
types of contractual right fall within the second category and what types do
not. The scope of the category may be inferred from cases that Lord Reed
JSC expressly assigned to it. Outside contract, the second category comprises
wrongful interference with goods or land, infringement of intellectual
property rights, and the equitable wrong of breach of confidence. With regard

88 Andrew Burrows, One Step Forward?, 134 L.Q. REV. 515, 519 (2018); see also BURROWS,
supra note 62, at 329; supra note 86, at 86–92.
89 In determining whether damages are inadequate, opening the jurisdiction to award specific
relief, the potential availability of negotiating damages must be ignored. See One Step (Support) Ltd. v.
Morris-Garner [2016] EWCA (Civ) 180, [2017] QB 1 [133]. If the availability of negotiating damages
depends upon the court having jurisdiction to grant specific relief, that jurisdiction cannot itself depend
upon whether negotiating damages are available.
90 For the inadequacy of damages as a pre-condition of granting specific relief, see Lawrence v.
Fen Tigers Ltd. [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822 [159], [171] (for injunctions); Co-Operative Ins. Soc’y
Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd. [1998] AC 1, 11 (for specific performance).
91 Mungalsingh v. Juman [2015] UKPC 38, [2016] 1 P & CR 7 [33]; Cavendish Square Holding
BV v. Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2016] AC 1172 [30].
92
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to breach of contract, Lord Reed JSC gave as examples “a right to control the
use of land, intellectual property or confidential information.”94 His Lordship
approved of the decision in Experience Hendrix mentioned above:
The agreement gave the claimant a valuable right to control
the use made of PPX’s copyright. When the copyright was
wrongfully used, the claimant was prevented from
exercising that right, and consequently suffered a loss
equivalent to the amount which could have been obtained by
exercising it.95
In every example given by Lord Reed JSC, the defendant promised not
to engage in certain conduct: not to make certain use of certain land, not to
make certain use of certain intellectual property, or not to make certain use
of certain confidential information. This indicates that only a negative
obligation can fall into the second category. But the second category does not
comprise all negative obligations, as Lord Reed’s rejection of negotiating
damages for breach of a non-competition clause demonstrates. Lord Reed’s
examples demonstrate that the second category is confined to promises not
to make use of a certain asset. Tangible property, intangible property, and
confidential information are all assets. A non-competition clause does not
involve the promise not to make use of a certain asset. Even if a business or
the goodwill of a business is regarded as an asset,96 wrongful competition
does not make use of that asset; it simply damages it.
There is uncertainty as to what counts as an asset in this context.
Suppose that a company, which plans to take photos of a certain area from
the air (which is assumed to be lawful), enters into a contract with the owner
of a parcel of land in that area and promises not to take photos of that
particular parcel of land. Views may differ on whether the breach of such a
promise amounts to making use of the land. Or suppose that a celebrity enters
into a contract with a media organization under which the latter promises not
to take photos of the celebrity in particular circumstances (which the media
organization would otherwise be free to do). Views may differ on whether
the right to privacy constitutes an asset in the present context.
Moreover, it is difficult to see why the availability of negotiating
damages for the breach of a negative obligation should depend upon whether
the obligation relates to some asset.97 Such a restriction may be justifiable if
94

Id.
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Id. at [89].
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See Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd. v. Yeo Boong Hua [2018] SGCA 44, [2018] 2 SLR 655
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negotiating damages are seen as being based on the gain made by the
defendant rather than as constituting compensation for loss. Many theories
on the types of wrong for which gain-based relief should be available at
common law require the infringement of a proprietary or quasi-proprietary
right98 or the infringement of an exclusive entitlement (at least as between
the parties) to exploit an asset.99 A number of commentators have argued that
a hypothetical license fee is properly to be characterized as being gain-based
and not compensatory in nature.100 However, Lord Reed JSC in MorrisGarner was adamant that negotiating damages are compensatory in nature.101
If they do compensate for the loss of the right to control the defendant’s
conduct, it is difficult to see why that conduct needs to amount to the use of
an asset.102
A comparison between a confidentiality agreement and a noncompetition agreement illustrates the point. Both were present in MorrisGarner, and Lord Reed JSC said that the breach of the confidentiality
covenant, considered in isolation, might have brought the case within the
second category of case in which negotiating damages are available but that
the trial judge had regarded the breach of the non-competition and nonsolicitation covenants as the most significant.103 It is unsatisfactory that Lord
Reed JSC simply deferred to a prioritization made by the trial judge, who
could not foresee that the Supreme Court would distinguish between the
various courses of action in respect of the availability of negotiating
damages.104
Consider the following example. X is employed by company Y, which
over time has built up confidential business information, for example a large
database of customers’ personal details. Using this information in breach of
his employment contract with Y, X sets up a rival business. The availability
of negotiating damages under Lord Reed’s second category depends upon the
type of negative obligation breached by X. If the employment contract

98 E.g., Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of
Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504 (1980); Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary
Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1 (2000); Sarah Worthington, Reconsidering
Disgorgement for Wrongs, 62 MOD. L. REV. 218 (1999).
99 See SIRKO HARDER, MEASURING DAMAGES IN THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: THE SEARCH FOR
HARMONISED PRINCIPLES 215–42 (2010).
100 E.g., JAMES EDELMAN, GAIN-BASED DAMAGES: CONTRACT, TORT, EQUITY AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 68–71 (2002); Burrows, supra note 83, at 165; Cunnington, supra note 83, at
225–27; Craig Rotherham, “Wrotham Park Damages” and Accounts of Profits: Compensation or
Restitution?, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 25 (2008).
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contains only a confidentiality covenant, negotiating damages are available.
If the employment contract contains only a non-competition covenant,
negotiating damages are not available. If the employment contract contains
both a confidentiality covenant and a non-competition covenant, the
availability of negotiating damages depends upon which covenant is more
significant, and it is unclear how this is to be determined. Where a
confidentiality covenant is present, the additional presence of a noncompetition covenant lowers Y’s protection. This is difficult to justify.
In conclusion, it is difficult to find a principled justification for a
restriction of negotiating damages in actions for breach of contract to the two
categories of case set out by the UK Supreme Court in Morris-Garner. The
remedy should be available whenever the claimant would otherwise obtain
only nominal damages. It should make no difference whether the award is
made under Lord Cairns’ Act or at common law. Furthermore, contrary to
what Lord Reed JSC in Morris-Garner suggested,105 it is difficult to see how
using the amount of a hypothetical license fee as evidence of the claimant’s
expectation loss is helpful or appropriate in cases in which negotiating
damages are unavailable.106
V.

CONCLUSION

After the decision by the House of Lords in Attorney General v. Blake,
negotiating damages (damages measured by reference to the amount of a
notional release fee) flourished in English contract law. This development
culminated in the Court of Appeal in Morris-Garner holding that negotiating
damages can be awarded in actions for breach of contract whenever the court
regards such an award as a just response. The Supreme Court in MorrisGarner rolled back that development and gave negotiating damages in
English contract law a more restrictive scope.
On principle, negotiating damages should not be available in actions for
breach of contract simply because the court regards such an award as a just
response. It has long been established that contractual damages aim to place
the claimant in the position as if the contract had been performed. Negotiating
damages do not place the claimant in that position but in the position as if the
contract had been replaced by a different contract. It does not follow that
negotiating damages should never be awarded in actions for breach of
contract. An award of negotiating damages is an appropriate way of avoiding
a remedial lacuna where the amount of expectation loss cannot be
determined.
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The Supreme Court in Morris-Garner regarded the presence of a
remedial lacuna neither as necessary nor as sufficient for the availability of
negotiating damages in actions for breach of contract. Instead, the Court set
out two overlapping categories of case in which the remedy can be awarded.
While the first category is defined by reference to certain procedural events,
the second category is defined by reference to the type of right infringed.
The first category comprises cases in which all of the following three
requirements are satisfied: the court has jurisdiction to grant specific relief,
the claimant has applied for specific relief, and the court denies specific relief
on discretionary grounds. In those circumstances, the availability of
negotiating damages is justified, as the court in effect compels the claimant
to grant the defendant a license and the defendant ought to pay a license fee.
But if this is accepted, it is difficult to see why negotiating damages should
be unavailable only because the claimant has not applied for specific relief
or only because the defendant’s wrongful conduct ceased prior to the
commencement of proceedings. In those sets of circumstances, the defendant
may be said to have appropriated a license and should face the prospect of
having to pay a license fee. The exclusion of negotiating damages is
justifiable where damages calculated in an orthodox way are adequate
(because substitute performance by a third party is available), as there is no
remedial lacuna.
The second category of case in which the Supreme Court in MorrisGarner regarded negotiating damages as available is where the defendant has
breached an obligation not to use an asset of the claimant or not to use that
asset in a certain manner. This includes at least the wrongful use of tangible
property, intellectual property, or confidential information. It does not
include the breach of a non-competition or non-solicitation clause. If
negotiating damages are characterized as being based on the gain made by
the defendant, as opposed to the loss suffered by the claimant, the restriction
of the second category to the wrongful use of an asset may have merit.
However, the Supreme Court in Morris-Garner was adamant that negotiating
damages compensate loss, namely the loss of the claimant’s right to restrict
the defendant’s conduct. But if negotiating damages are characterized in that
way, their restriction to the wrongful use of an asset, as opposed to every
breach of a negative obligation, cannot be justified.
The two categories of case set out by the Supreme Court in MorrisGarner correspond to the two jurisdictional bases of awarding damages for
breach of contract. While the first category involves an award of damages
under the modern equivalent of Lord Cairns’ Act, the second category
involves an award of damages at common law. But the circumstances in
which negotiating damages are available in an action for breach of contract
should not depend upon the jurisdictional basis of the award. Lord Cairns’
Act facilitated the procedure of awarding damages at a time when the rules
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of equity and the rules of the common law were still administered by different
courts. It should not have a substantive effect today.
Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Morris-Garner is unsatisfactory.
While it may have clarified the law, it drew demarcation lines that cannot be
justified on principle. It may also have awkward consequences in practice. In
cases in which it is clear that the court, having jurisdiction to grant specific
relief, will deny specific relief on discretionary grounds, claimants now have
an incentive to make a futile claim for specific relief for the sole purpose of
rendering negotiating damages available. Furthermore, in cases that do not
fall into the second category, most notably the breach of a non-competition
covenant, negotiating damages are available only if proceedings are
commenced while the wrong is still ongoing. There is, thus, an incentive for
litigation and a disincentive for out-of-court settlement.
A contracting party that negotiates for a non-competition covenant (or
any other obligation falling outside the second category laid down by the
Supreme Court in Morris-Garner) in its favor may now wish to negotiate
also for a clause in the contract which provides that in the event of breach the
innocent party has the option to claim a notional release fee instead of
damages assessed in the ordinary way. In a contract between two
businesses,107 such a clause is unlikely to constitute an unenforceable penalty
as a notional release fee should rarely be out of proportion to the innocent
party’s legitimate interest in the other party’s performance of the primary
obligations under the contract.108

107 Every term (other than a core term) in a contract between a business and a consumer is subject
to the control of unfair contract terms under Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK). A term that
purports to provide the business with additional remedies in the case of breach by the consumer may be
unfair. See Consumer Rights Act 2015, sch. 2, ¶¶ 5, 6 (UK).
108 Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2016] AC 1172; see Sirko
Harder, The Rule Against Contractual Penalties in Great Britain and Ireland, 11 EUR. J. COMM. CONT.
L. 1, 9–10 (2019).

